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TONE DEAF TO THE PAST:
MORE QUALMS ABOUT
PUBLIC MEANING ORIGINALISM
Jack Rakove*
With some apologies for a vast degree of oversimplification, let us
stipulate that there are two main forms of originalism. One is known as
“semantic” or “public meaning” originalism. Its leading advocates include
Lawrence Solum, Keith Whittington, and Randy Barnett (professional
friends, all). The leading premise of semantic originalism is that the
meaning of the constitutional text—or, more specifically, of its individual
clauses—was fixed at the moment of its adoption. Under this view, the goal
of constitutional interpretation is to recover that original meaning, and the
best way to do that pivots on reconstructing how an informed reader,
whether a citizen or a judge—and using the best linguistic resources
available—would have understood the language in question. This approach
does not assume that the Constitution’s entire content was fixed at the point
of adoption. Ample room is left for the subsequent construction of
additional meanings, in places where the Constitution is silent or
ambiguous; originalists can differ—and differ substantially—over where to
draw the boundaries between the realms of fixation and construction.1 In
this approach, evidence of the political intentions and purposes of the
adopters of the text—whether Framers or ratifiers—appears to have
relatively little if any bearing on the Constitution’s meaning. The
statements they made in debate matter not as evidence of political intention,
but rather as additional linguistic clues to the semantic meaning of disputed
terms.
The second form of originalism involves an approach that academic
historians naturally favor. For want of a better term, let us simply describe
this as “historically grounded” originalism. This approach assumes that the
original meaning (or potential meanings) of specific clauses was the
product of a set of political debates, in which both the expressed intentions
of the Constitution’s Framers and the understandings of its ratifiers would
prove relevant to ascertaining what the document originally meant. This
approach is less confident of, and less devoted to, the possibility of affixing
* William Robertson Coe Professor of History and American Studies and Professor of
Political Science, Stanford University.
1. Thus Jack Balkin, an originalist on the Left, is short on fixation and long on
construction. See generally JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011).
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one meaning to a disputed text. It is perfectly comfortable with treating the
adoption of the Constitution as the result of debates that did not end in a
linguistic consensus on the definition and meaning of key terms. Moreover,
the idea that a given meaning was fixed at a finite moment of historical time
seems equally problematic—a useful legal fiction perhaps, but a wholly
unrealistic way to imagine how constitutional texts (or any other texts)
actually operate or perform. That conception becomes even more doubtful
when one considers the highly dynamic nature of political thinking during
the Revolutionary era.
It is no secret that historically grounded approaches to the project of
discovering or recovering the original meaning of the Constitution appear
out of fashion. The number of historians who are actively concerned with
originalism is quite small; the four scholars contributing to this forum are
probably the best-known examples.2 Most historians consider originalism a
game for lawyers and a playing field for that much-lampooned
phenomenon: law office history. That dismissive attitude on the part of
academic historians regrettably mistakes the significance of this realm of
inquiry. Historians should feel a civic, as well as an academic, commitment
to deal with legitimate questions about the origins of the Constitution, even
when those questions arise from a different (though still cognate) field. It is
also important to recognize that the divergence between the semantic and
historical approaches identifies a crucial fault line in our very conception of
American constitutionalism. Semantic originalism, as a lawyer’s game, is
inevitably devoted to constitutional jurisprudence as performed by the
Supreme Court and, in particular, to the versions of originalism championed
by Justices Scalia and Thomas. By contrast, a historical approach to the
original meaning of the Constitution, though hardly oblivious to judicial
uses and abuses of the past, conceives of American constitutionalism as
retaining fundamentally political elements. It does not regard the
Constitution solely as a document framed primarily for later judicial
interpretation, important as that may be. The political stories that explain
how the Constitution was framed, interpreted, and amended—in other
words, how it developed—would remain essential to a historically
grounded approach to its meaning, both original and derivative.
The historical perspective helps to explain the origins and evolution of
my own interest in originalism, which dates to the early 1970s. That
interest was driven not by questions of judicial interpretation, and especially
not those emanating from the intellectual controversy over Brown v. Board
of Education,3 but from the intense political debates of that period,
particularly the enactment of the War Powers Act4 and the wonderfully
entrancing Watergate affair that ended in the near-impeachment and
resignation of Richard Milhous Nixon. Both of those momentous issues

2. Nevertheless, it is nice to note that Saul Cornell, Jonathan Gienapp, Helen Irving,
and I do represent different scholarly generations.
3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4. 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2012).

2015]

QUALMS ABOUT PUBLIC MEANING ORIGINALISM

971

involved questions about the original meaning of the Constitution, but in
contexts where judicial involvement would be secondary or nonexistent.5
Two factors determined my approach to recovering the original meaning
(or “meanings”) of the Constitution. One was the excitement of working on
the history of the American Revolution during the intellectually vibrant era
that began with the publication of Bernard Bailyn’s Ideological Origins of
the American Revolution6 shortly before I started graduate study in 1969,
which was the same year Gordon Wood’s amazing doctoral dissertation
was published as The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787.7 It
has long been customary for readers—both historians and scholars in other
fields—to link these two works to the advent of republicanism as a
dominant concept in the interpretation of the origins of American political
ideas. But for someone learning the trade of doing history, the works were
equally exciting for the way in which they conveyed and depicted the nature
of historical change itself. Bailyn illustrated this motif nicely in opening his
chapter on the “transformation” of colonial constitutional ideas in the
decade before Independence:
Words and concepts had been reshaped in the colonists’ minds in the
course of a decade of pounding controversy—strangely reshaped, turned
in unfamiliar directions, toward conclusions they could not themselves
clearly perceive. They found a new world of political thought as they
struggled to work out the implications of their beliefs in the years before
Independence. It was a world not easily possessed; often they withdrew
in some confusion to more familiar ground.8

The authors of the first state constitutions of the mid-1770s and the
adopters of the federal Constitution of 1787 pursued that quest, Bailyn
observed.9 The complexity of their pursuit formed the subject of Wood’s
great book, which traced in intricate detail the complex ways in which the
core concepts of American constitutional thinking evolved between 1776
and 1787.10 Yet what makes these works intellectually exciting to the
sentient historian is not only their substantive account of what Americans
were thinking and doing, but also their conception and portrayal of the
process of historical change itself. Describing change over time defines the
narrative challenge that historians routinely face; not everyone is equally
adept in this exercise. These two works offered remarkable explanations
for the dynamic character of political thinking in a revolutionary context.
5. Of course, one needs to take account of United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974),
which made the impeachment proceedings (even more) inevitable. Part of my interest also
developed from my membership in The Reservists Committee to Stop the War and its suit to
require members of Congress to resign either their military commissions in the reserves or
their seats on Capitol Hill. Cf. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S.
208 (1974). Those were heady times, and I actually remember them.
6. BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
(enlarged ed. 1992).
7. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787 (1969).
8. See BAILYN, supra note 6, at 161.
9. See id.
10. See WOOD, supra note 7, at 273–82.
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The second factor that shaped my approach was the assumption (or
rather, the conviction) that any satisfactory answer to the problem of what
the Constitution originally meant would necessarily have to be historical in
nature. What other choice could there possibly be? To ask what a political
document originally meant had to involve asking questions about the
intentions of its authors (here let’s call them the Framers of the
Constitution) and the understanding of its ratifiers (here identified either as
members of the American public or as delegates to the state ratification
conventions whose unequivocal approval of the Constitution made it the
supreme law of the land). Clearly distinguishing the meaning of a text from
the intentions of its authors and the understanding of its ratifiers seemed to
be an essential, though not sufficient, methodological rule that one had to
apply to talk intelligently about what the Constitution originally meant,
particularly when other commentators on this subject appeared to use these
three terms (“meaning,” “intention,” “understanding”) loosely or
interchangeably.
Still, these definitions marked only a preliminary step in establishing a
historically sound approach to the problem of doing originalism. The
greater challenge was the one that historians always face in resolving some
“anomaly”—some alteration occurring in the flow of time—about the past:
to identify and then to weigh the evidentiary value of the primary sources
that one can bring to bear to solve some problem about historical action. As
I began working seriously on originalism in the early 1980s, shortly after
my Stanford Law School colleague Paul Brest apparently invented that term
in a seminal article,11 my goal was to develop an analytical method or
model for dealing with these sources. Four categories of evidence seemed
relevant to the task. Two I regarded as being textual in nature: the relevant
evidence bearing directly on the framing of the Constitution, primarily
including the records of debates and related documents that are directly
indicative of what the Framers were thinking12 and the wide array of
sources documenting the ratification debates that occurred once the
Constitution was published on September 19, 1787.13 Two other sets of
sources I considered contextual in nature: first, the relevant intellectual
background that Americans inherited; and second, the inferences that could
be drawn from their own political activities and involvements, particularly
in the decade between declaring independence and preparing for the debates
of 1787. (The former of these I sometimes allude to, rather loosely, as “the
zeitgeist”; the second could be called “lessons of experience.”14)
11. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L.
REV. 204, 204 n.1 (1980) (“I use the term ‘originalism’ to describe the interpretation of text
and original history as distinguished, for example, from the interpretation of precedents and
social values.”).
12. See, e.g., THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand ed.,
rev. ed. 1937).
13. See e.g., THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
(John Kaminski et al. eds., 2012).
14. For further discussion, see JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND
IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 3–22 (1996).
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Within these two subcategories of sources, a working historian might
prefer to favor the intentions of the Framers, the actual authors of the
document, over the understandings of the ratifiers, who were merely its
readers. That preference, however, would rub against the normative
concern laid down by James Madison in 1796, which held that the ratifiers’
understandings were legally authoritative in a way that the mere proposals
of the Framers were not.15
The contextual realm poses a different problem. Intellectual historians
would incline to give greater weight to the authority of eminent writers—
Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Bolingbroke, Montesquieu, Hume, and
Blackstone—as well as the less-celebrated names who also influenced
American readers, such as Henry Parker, John Trenchard and Thomas
Gordon, Jean-Louis de Lolme, and James Burgh. Political historians might
instead conclude that lessons of experience outweighed the influence of
great writers. The Framers of the Constitution, after all, were part of the
same revolutionary generation who rejected imperial authority, waged a war
of national liberation, and then struggled to cope with its consequences.
How they thought about constitutional issues must surely have been a
significant part of that experience, at least as important as their reading.
But giving too much weight to any of these preferences would distort the
historian’s method rather than advance it. One wants to take all form of
evidence seriously and then find ways to assay the evidence’s relative value
in specific situations.
From these general comments, one can easily infer why a historian’s
approach to the Founding era would diverge from the methods of semantic
originalists. First, and arguably most important, the dominant emphasis in
historical writings on the creativity of revolutionary political thinking
hardly accords with the reigning presumptions of semantic originalism. As
Bailyn, Wood, and others have demonstrated, the quarter century from the
Stamp Act controversy of 1765–1766 to the framing and ratification of the
Bill of Rights in 1789–1791 was a remarkably fruitful and creative epoch in
the history of political thinking and constitutional innovation.16 The idea
that core concepts would remain linguistically stable in this period, or that
definitions inherited from British practice and usage would prove equally
applicable in America, thus becomes highly problematic. The task of the
historian is to trace how these definitions and conceptions changed. Part of
that endeavor certainly includes examining the ways in which the
deliberations of the late 1780s constituted a radical rethinking of the
assumptions and beliefs of 1776. That was the enormously complex and
subtle achievement of Wood’s first great book. But the work also involved
examining how the breadth of the changes that the Federalists proposed
15. See JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 568–80 (Jack Rakove ed., 1999); see also RAKOVE,
supra note 14, at 361–65 (discussing Madison’s April 6, 1796, speech). Jonathan Gienapp’s
work will vastly expand our grasp of the evolution of these originalist ideas in the course of
numerous congressional debates from 1789–1796. See Jonathan Gienapp, Historicism and
Holism: Failures of Originalist Translation, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 935 (2015).
16. See generally BAILYN, supra note 6; WOOD, supra note 7.

974

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

“left” their Anti-Federalist opponents, in Wood’s brilliant phrasing,
“holding remnants of thought that had lost their significance.”17
This perception of the underlying character of Revolutionary-era
constitutionalism hardly fits well with the dominant motif of semantic
originalism, the so-called “fixation” principle, which holds that the
linguistic content of a constitutional provision is set at the moment of its
adoption, in terms whose meaning are already transparent to contemporary
users. As a legal principle, fixation seems like a wholly plausible theory: a
document is drafted, its authors and signers have objectives—intentions—
they seek to secure, and they do their best to impart those intentions into the
text. Once its content is fixed in this way, later interpreters have a legal
obligation to ascertain and apply those intentions. Or so semantic
originalists like to think.
Yet a document emerging from the kind of deliberative and polemical
process that led to the adoption of the Constitution has distinctive (and
perhaps unique) qualities that other forms of communication might not
possess. Drafting a constitution is not the same as having a conversation in
which each participant works hard to clarify his or her meaning. A
constitution can be compared to a contract or compact, but who were the
contracting parties—who were the true adopters? Were they the Framers
whose intentions shaped its language, or the ratifiers whose assent was
required for its approval? Yet when the ratifiers acted, they were not
deciding the meaning of individual clauses, but voting on the Constitution
in toto, through a single vote on the entire text. Who could authoritatively
resolve the ambiguities in the text that became evident as the contents of the
Constitution were debated in public? Surely not the Framers acting
collectively. After all, the Federal Convention was a onetime meeting that
would never reassemble—notwithstanding the persisting qualms of
Edmund Randolph, the nonsigning delegate who originally presented the
Virginia Plan on May 28, 1787, and who continued to believe that a second
general convention should indeed assemble to discuss the amendments
proposed by the state ratification conventions.18
Of course, it is the very difficulty of using the records of debate to derive
wholly persuasive originalist explanations of the most controvertible
clauses of the Constitution that has driven avowed originalists to take the
linguistic turn. The comfort that historians will take in sorting out a debate
will often fall short of the level of certainty that avowed originalists would
desire. Historical originalists can be perfectly content in identifying the
rival assumptions, concerns, and (yes) definitions of key words that explain
variances in opinion among the adopters, proponents, and critics of the
17. See WOOD, supra note 7, at 524.
18. This creates a contrast with the Massachusetts Convention of 1779–1780, which did
reassemble after blustery winter storms to survey the returns of the towns to the constitution
that John Adams had largely drafted during his brief return home in 1779. The records of
those deliberations are available in the exemplary THE POPULAR SOURCES OF POLITICAL
AUTHORITY: DOCUMENTS ON THE MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTION OF 1780 (Oscar Handlin &
Mary Flug Handlin eds., 1966).
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Constitution. Yet they also remain free to conclude that some explanations
of the original meaning of a clause make better sense than others. Here, for
example, one can have lots of fun19 reviewing the majority and minority
opinions in District of Columbia v. Heller,20 by far the most originalist
decision of them all, and contrasting the different ways in which Justices
Scalia and Stevens deal with the evidence of the past. Some interpretations
of the original meaning of particular clauses will prove more plausible or
persuasive than others; there is good reason to give greater interpretive
authority to, say, The Federalist than to any of a number of other
publications that appeared in 1787–1788. Historians who do originalism
have an obligation to explain why they believe some sources have greater
probative value than others. Yet neither can they escape the fundamentally
political character of the debate they are analyzing.
Rather than rely as much as they do on the linguistic theory of Paul
Grice, one wonders why semantic originalists do not pay more attention to
the linguistic ideas that were dominant in eighteenth-century America.21
There is no better account of the linguistic difficulties that Americans
would have to face in thinking constitutionally than James Madison’s
brilliant epistemological reflection on the nature of political reasoning in
Federalist 37.22 Embedded in this analysis is a crisp distillation of John
Locke’s discussion of language in Book III of An Essay Concerning Human
Understanding.23 “Besides the obscurity arising from the complexity of
objects, and the imperfection of the human faculties,” Madison observed,
the medium through which the conceptions of men are conveyed to each
other adds a fresh embarrassment. The use of words is to express ideas.
Perspicuity, therefore, requires not only that the ideas should be distinctly
formed, but that they should be expressed by words distinctly and
exclusively appropriate to them. But no language is so copious as to
supply words and phrases for every complex idea, or so correct as not to
include many equivocally denoting different ideas. Hence it must happen
that however accurately objects may be discriminated in themselves, and
19. Unless one also happens to think that American opinions about the Second
Amendment correlate causally with (1) our high homicide rate, (2) suicides that might have
been avoided because guns provide the most effective means of self-annihilation, and (3) the
greater likelihood that a firearm kept handy for self-defense within the home will end with
the accidental injury or death of an innocent party rather than justice rendered on a criminal
intruder. I am disappointed that the periodic group murders that regularly punctuate our
headlines are not greeted with public statements confirming that these casualties, regrettable
as they are, are simply the price we need to pay for that “palladium of liberty” (to cite an
eighteenth-century phrase) and the Second Amendment as explained by Justice Scalia in the
most prominent application of semantic originalism, the majority opinion in District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
20. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
21. For an explanation of these linguistic ideas, see Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism
and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 455 n.3 (2013); Lawrence B.
Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479, 480
(2013); Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST.
COMMENT. 95, 96 (2010).
22. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison).
23. JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, bk. III (Peter H.
Nidditch ed., Clarendon ed. 1975) (1689).
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however accurately the discrimination may be considered, the definition
of them may be rendered inaccurate by the inaccuracy of the terms in
which it is delivered. And this unavoidable inaccuracy must be greater or
less, according to the complexity and novelty of the objects defined.
When the Almighty himself condescends to address mankind in their own
language, his meaning, luminous as it must be, is rendered dim and
doubtful by the cloudy medium through which it is communicated.24

Locke’s assault on the stability of linguistic meaning, or on ideas of
linguistic fixity, was radical, as we know from the brilliant work of the
English historian Hannah Dawson.25 And unlike the work of Grice, which
was not framed with political discussions in mind, Locke was deeply
mindful of the insidious effects that semantic instability could have on
matters of public concern, including law and religion.26
Locke’s critique of language in turn inspired an eighteenth-century
reaction that attempted to provide language with a degree of fixity and
stability it seemed to lack. The period was a great era in the history of the
dictionary, and Samuel Johnson, that great man of letters, was hardly alone
in pursuing that quest.27 But in the realm of politics and constitutionalism
more generally, events continued to prove disruptive of linguistic stability.
Critical terms, like constitution or executive power, or establishment of
religion or sovereignty, came under sustained pressure, not least because of
the inventiveness of American revolutionary politics. Anyone who thinks
he can establish conditions of linguistic fixation without taking that
turbulent set of events into account is pursuing a fool’s errand.28

24. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, supra note 22 (James Madison).
25. See infra note 26.
26. See HANNAH DAWSON, LOCKE, LANGUAGE, AND EARLY-MODERN PHILOSOPHY 129–
53 (2007) (discussing “semantic instability”); Hannah Dawson, Locke on Language in
(Civil) Society, 26 HIST. OF POL. THOUGHT 397, 399 (2005).
27. See, e.g., JOHN HOWE, LANGUAGE AND POLITICAL MEANING IN REVOLUTIONARY
AMERICA 20–23 (2004).
28. In my immodest view, much more work needs to be done on the entire concept of
political language as such. Dawson’s work, see sources cited supra note 26, is helpful in this
account; so is PHILIP PETTIT, MADE WITH WORDS: HOBBES ON LANGUAGE, MIND, AND
POLITICS (2008). On the American side, John Howe, see supra note 27, is very helpful, not
least in discussing the eighteenth-century response to Locke’s assault.

